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THE ALLEY BEHIND FIRST STREET, NORTHEAST:
CRIMINAL ABORTION IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL, 1872-1973
DOUGLAS R. MILLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty-two years ago, the United States Supreme Court struck
down the conception-to-birth prohibitions on abortion that had
operated for at least a century in almost every state.' As women
learned they no longer needed to choose between involuntary
parenthood and the secretive, often fatal underworld of criminal
abortion, the impact of the ruling resonated across the nation. The
practices Roe ended that day in 1973 were by no means remote.
The streets and back alleys in the shadow of One First Street, NE
had witnessed a rich history of illegal abortion for decades before
the Court's stately edifice was erected on that site. Since the
comprehensive prohibition statute of 1872, Washington, D.C. had
been home to the nameless practitioners, clandestine contacts,
bribery, raids, arrests, and prosecutions that typified the illegal
practice of abortion in America.
To explore the District of Columbia's experience of criminal
abortion, this article undertakes an historical survey of the state
and the development of law before prohibition; the enactment,
evolution, and justification of prohibition; and the records left by
those who fell afoul of the law. Part II of this article examines the
history of abortion regulation from theological, philosophical, and
political perspectives. Beginning with Greek and Hebrew
approaches to fetal development and tortious miscarriage, Part IIA
proceeds through early Christian and medieval reasoning to
arrive at the 'quickening' distinction used in the common law,
which designated the first fetal movement as the moment of
ensoulment and, thus, of full legal protection. Part IIB then
examines the nineteenth century physicians' campaign that
engendered the District's 1872 statute. This section inquires into the
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1. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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self-interested motivations of the American Medical Association in
restricting abortion to its members' control, together with the
dubious physiological and social arguments the campaign proffered
in support of its cause. Part III examines the various proposed and
enacted District of Columbia statutes that grew out of the
nineteenth century anti-abortion movement. Part IV of this article
constructs an anecdotal history of criminal abortion experiences
based on published opinions of District of Columbia courts. This
history yields narratives of desperate women's tragic deaths, their
legal disabilities and ordeals in the courts, targeting of physicians
by the government, bribery of witnesses and police by the accused,
and defenses ranging from the obvious to the bizarre. The survey of
cases culminates with United States v. Vuitch,2 the test case that,
for a brief period, made D.C. the most liberal abortion jurisdiction
in the United States and galvanized the nationwide legal challenge
to abortion prohibitions.
The history of criminal abortion is no mere academic curiosity.
The debate over abortion regulation continues to divide America,
and the future of unrestricted abortion remains in doubt. Both sides
of the debate are myopic in their rhetoric: abortion rights supporters
advocate personal autonomy without reference to fetal protection;
abortion opponents champion fetuses while dismissing women's
interests in self-determination. In order to effectively rule and legislate
on abortion, jurists and politicians must understand the complex
philosophical history that underlies the moral and political debate.
More importantly, they must understand the social history of criminal
abortion in order to comprehend the inevitable consequences of
prohibition. This article's choice of focus is motivated by the belief
that a social history unfolding in the very neighborhoods where
national leaders live and work will prove especially compelling.
II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND
OF ABORTION REGULATION
Within the span of seventy-two years, District of Columbia law
progressed from a complete absence of codified abortion regulations
to a near total ban on the practice. In order to understand the pre-
statute legal status of abortion and the rapid move to prohibition,
this section begins with the first principles and traces the philosophical
and political history of abortion from classical antiquity into the
nineteenth century.
2. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
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A. The Common Law View of Abortion
The essential conflict in the modern debate over abortion is
between women's personal autonomy and privacy interests and the
putative fetal interest in avoiding injury and death. Given the
subordinate status women held in most cultures from at least the
agricultural revolution into the twentieth century, the historical
abortion debate was not conducted in those terms. Female autonomy
was hardly a concern of natural and religious philosophers for whom
the propriety of abortion would depend solely on fetal status.
Nonetheless, what the law does not proscribe, it tacitly allows, so
any restriction of abortion based on fetal personhood necessarily
required some rational justification if it were to legitimately abridge
a previously unrestricted practice. One necessary element of this
rational foundation must be a determination of the gestational
moment at which the proposed fetal protection attaches. Logically,
there are three temporal options from which to choose. The fetus
may acquire protected status at the moment of conception, at the
moment of birth, or at some intermediate moment. The ultimate
solution of the common law, an intermediate gestational point
known as 'quickening,' resulted from centuries of evolution and
synthesis among natural, legal, and religious philosophy.3
1. The biblical origins of mid-gestational legal protection
The fountainhead of Western theological reasoning on fetal
status is the tortious miscarriage provision of Exodus 21: 22-25:
And if two men are fighting and one should strike a pregnant
woman so that her fruits come forth, but there is no harm, then
he shall certainly be fined as the woman's husband imposes on
him, and he shall pay as the judges assess. But if harm should
occur, then you must give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth,
hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound,
bruise for bruise.4
3. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
4. Exodus 21: 22-25. This English version is the author's and represents a compromise
among the King James, J.P.S., New Revised Standard, Everett Fox, and NewJ.P.S. English
translations. Because of these verses' contentious subject matter, their translations tend to
reflect the political and theological views of the translators. The author has attempted to
provide the most neutral rendering of the text for the purposes of this discussion. Hence he
has used the literal "fruits" rather than "children," and the literal "come forth" rather than
.are born," "abort," or "miscarry.' He has also refrained from interpolating "further" before
'harm," as some modern versions do, because it is not supported by the literal text and
2004]
4 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 11:001
The precise meaning of this passage is obscure. Under one
interpretation, it means that tortious miscarriage is punishable by
fine only, but harm to the adult woman is punishable according to
the lex talionis.' Under this reading, the fetus enjoys a lesser legal
protection than the mother, or possibly no protection at all because
the fine paid to the father may be seen as compensation for the loss
of an heir, rather than as a penalty to punish commission of a
wrong.' Thus, this reading places the point of legal protection
at birth.
An alternative interpretation holds that, because the word pa
(-son, 'harm') takes no indirect object in the text, and because the
tortious wounding or killing of an adult is proscribed elsewhere in
the Pentateuch' thus obviating the need for a special provision
protecting pregnant women independent of their fetuses, lex
talionis does apply to fetal harm.' Indeed, because the passage can
be read as referring to premature birth as well as miscarriage, the
law may contemplate intermediate punishments for non-fatal
harm to the fetus; should the child be born disfigured or disabled,
the appropriate lex talionis corporeal or monetary sanction would
be imposed on the tortfeasor.9 Under this viewpoint, the fetus does
enjoy equal protection with the mother, because the same scale of
penalties applies to those who harm either of the two. Furthermore,
no intermediate gestational date must be achieved by the fetus to
obtain the law's protection under this reading. In theory, the fully-
protected status would attach at conception, obvious evidentiary
problems notwithstanding.
Regardless of which of these interpretations is 'correct,' it is
clear that by the third century B.C., the Alexandrian Jewish
community had adopted the former.'0 The Septuagint (the
Alexandrian Jews' translation of the Hebrew bible into the Greek
vernacular), renders the pliu rule as turning not on whether 'harm'
or 'no harm' is present, but rather on whether or not the child is
born e clKovlallvOv(exeikonismenon, fTully formed')., In other
words, if tortious injury to a pregnant woman caused the
miscarriage of a fetus not fully formed, then a fine would apply, but
prejudices the solution to the ambiguity addressed in this discussion.
5. Mark S. Scott, Note, Quickening in the Common Law: The Legal Precedent Roe
Attempted and Failed to Use, 1 MICH. L. & PoLY REV. 199,202 (1996).
6. Id.
7. See Exodus 21: 12-14; Leviticus 24:19-20; Numbers 35: 9-34; Deuteronomy 4: 41-43.
8. Scott, supra note 5, at 203.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 204.
11. Id. at 205.
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if a fully formed fetus were stillborn, the tortfeasor was liable
according to the lex talionis.'9 Thus, by at least the third century
B.C., Exodus 21: 22-25 had come to signify a mid-gestational point
for the attachment of fetal protection under the law.
2. Development of the quickening concept from the mid-
gestational onset of legal protection
The Septuagint became the basis for early Christian Latin
versions of the Pentateuch, and thus the Alexandrian interpretation
of fetal personhood as attaching at mid-gestation became the
accepted view within the early Christian church."3 The exact point
at which protection attached was not defined; the distinction
between tortious miscarriage and capital feticide was determined
only post hoc, based on the evidentiary standard of fe I KO VI G/IC Vo V.14
In forming a more precise rule of fetal law, the early church turned
its attentions to ideas developed a century before the Septuagint's
translation: the natural philosophy of Aristotle and his contemporaries
at the Lyceum.15
Aristotle reasoned that gestation encompassed three stages
during which the fetus possessed three distinct 'souls': the Vlvxy
Opeinr Tf (psyche threptike, 'nutritive soul'), 0rVX4 ajl0JT7'K,q
(psyche aisthitike, 'sensitive soul'), and iVX'u 6l Vv17VlKlf(psyche
dianoitike, 'rational soul').'" Before infusion with the rational soul,
the fetus was not human but, rather, an undifferentiated animal:
sentient, but without reason. 7 Indeed, the classical Greek world
view, linked as it was to that society's mythological tradition, did
not exclude the notion that a human might give birth to a lesser
animal or indeed a monster.'8
Aristotle's natural philosophy thus presented the early church
with a more concrete basis for the mid-gestational commencement
of human status and legal entitlement. 9 The Christian Neoplatonists
developed Aristotle's concept of OrvX#u and particularly vX ri
6iaVot7riz1'K4 into the Christian notion of anima, or 'immortal
12. Id.
13. Id. at 208-09.
14. Id. at 205-06.
15. Id. at 209.
16. Id. at 210-11.
17. Id. at 211.
18. id. (indicating that children who were deformed or extremely mentally retarded
could be considered monsters).
19. Id.
2004]
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soul.2 This anima is the rational and uniquely human essence
believed to inhabit and survive the human body, ultimately to be
reunited with it through resurrection conditioned on salvation.21
Saint Augustine subsequently applied the Christian concept of
anima to Exodus 21: 22-25, distinguishing the soulless, and thus
unprotected, fetus (embryo inanimatus)" from the legally protected,
ensouled embryo (embryo animatus)23
It was Saint Augustine's Neoplatonic understanding of
gestation and ensoulment that formed the basis for Saint Thomas
Aquinas's interpolation of mid-gestational fetal protection into the
canon law some eight centuries later.24 "[O]ne would be guilty of
homicide," Aquinas announced, "if the death either of the mother or
the ensouled fetus were to result from a blow to a pregnant woman."2 5
In medieval England, the word cwike (cwuca in Old English,
later quycke, quicke, and eventually quick) had come to mean both
'alive' and 'moving.'26 The conflation of these dual meanings, as
applied to Neoplatonist Christian dogma, resulted in a rather novel
solution to the fetal status problem: the fetus's first kick was
believed to signify the arrival of the rational soul.27 This result was
justified by either of two explanations. Under the first, a kick was
a 'sensible' motion, and thus only achievable once the work of the
sensitive soul was finished (i.e. the moment at which the rational
soul was ready to take over).' Under the second, a kick was a
'voluntary' motion, and thus impossible until the rational soul had
taken hold." The English religious understanding of ensoulment at
quickening therefore provided a precise moment at which the canon
law distinction between pre-ensoulment fetal death and post-
ensoulment homicide could be drawn.
The common law's adoption of the canon law distinction did not
occur immediately. According to Henri de Bracton's understanding
of the common law around A.D. 1230, "If one strikes a pregnant
woman or gives her poison in order to procure an abortion, if the
foetus is already formed or quickened, especially if it is quickened,
20. Id.
21. Id. at 213-14.
22. The Latin usage of embryo and puerperium, translated as 'fetus,' does not
correspond with the embryo/fetus distinction in modern English.
23. Scott, supra note 5, at 214.
24. Id. at 217.
25. ST. THOMASAQUINAs,2QuAESTIODISPUTATADE SPIXITUALIBUS CREATURIS 64, quoted
in Scott, supra note 5, at 218.
26. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
27. Scott, supra note 5, at 221-22.
28. Id. at 222.
29. Id.
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he commits homicide."30 This formulation does not comport precisely
with the canon law view. To Bracton, the abortion of any
puerperium formatum ('formed fetus') was homicide; the abortion
ofapuerperium animatum ('quickened fetus'), was more egregious,
but it was not the sole act punishable as abortion. 1 Thus Bracton
seems to have believed that legal protection attached to the fetus at
some point earlier in pregnancy.
Half a century later, however, Fleta32 restated Bracton's rule
with the following alteration: "if the foetus was already formed and
quickened."33 By replacing vel with et, Fleta harmonized the
common law view with the contemporary canon law, attaching legal
protection to the fetus only at the moment of quickening.
3
The recognition of quickening as the point of ensoulment and
legal protection seems to have continued through the common law's
history. In 1680, Edward Coke stated the law of abortion and
tortious miscarriage thus:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by potion or otherwise
killeth it in her wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe
dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe; this is a
great misprision, and no murder: but if the childe be born alive,
and dieth of the potion, battery or other cause, this is murder
.... And so horrible an offence should not go unpunished. And
so was the law holden in Bracton's time ... [a]nd herewith
agreeth Fleta.'
Coke thus imposes an additional (perhaps evidentiary)
standard of live birth to draw the line between misdemeanor
feticide and murder, although the requirement of quickening for
any legal protection remains constant.' Blackstone apparently
adopted Coke's view in compiling his Commentaries sixty years later:
mo kill a child in its mother's womb is now no murder, but a
great misprision: but if the child be born alive and dieth by
30. 2 HENRI DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 341 (Samuel E.
Thorne, ed. 1968) (1230 A.D.), quoted in Scott, supra note 5, at 224.
31. Scott, supra note 5, at 224-25.
32. Fleta was the anonymous author of the primary thirteenth century commentary
on Bracton and was possibly an inmate of London's Fleet Prison.
33. 2 FLETA, SEU COIMENTARIUS JURIS ANGLICANI 60-61 (H.G. Richardson & G.O.
Sayles, eds. 1955) (1290 A.D.) (emphasis added).
34. Scott, supra note 5, at 225.
35. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *50.
36. See id.
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reason of the potion or bruises it received in the womb, it seems,
by the better opinion, to be murder in such as administered or
gave them. 7
Because Blackstone and Coke became the most important
secondary sources of common law in the eighteenth century
American colonies, it is reasonable to assume that the earliest
United States jurists shared Blackstone's and Coke's understanding
of abortion. At the time of American independence, the state of the
law therefore appears to have been as follows: pre-quickening
abortion was not illegal, post-quickening abortion was misdemeanor
feticide, and post-quickening abortion that resulted in the birth of
a live child which subsequently died of its injuries was murder.
Hence, some fifteen years after American independence, the
new District of Columbia became heir to a common law abortion
framework which represented the synthesis of over two
millennia of Jewish, Greek, Christian, and English moral, natural,
and legal reasoning.
B. The Nineteenth-Century American Campaign for Birth-to-
Conception Prohibition
Abortion remained subject to common law regulation in
England and the United States until 1803. In that year, the British
parliament passed Lord Ellenborough's Act,' making post-quickening
abortion a capital offense. 9 Pre-quickening abortion was deemed a
non-capital felony, rendering the convict "liable to be fined,
imprisoned, set in and upon the Pillory, publickly or privately
whipped... or to be transported beyond the Seas for any Term not
exceeding fourteen Years.' °
American legislatures did not take up abortion until two
decades later, and when they did, the new laws resembled poison
control measures more than attempts to curb abortion per se.4'
Crucially, they did not abolish the quickening distinction, and they
did not prohibit abortion so much as the commercial sale of patent
abortifacients.' Highly restrictive laws which, until 1973, criminalized
most abortions from conception onward, emerged as the result of a
37. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES "198.
38. 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, §§ 1-2 (1860) (Eng.).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME 10 (1997).
42. d.
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concerted effort begun in 1857 by the newly-formed American
Medical Association (AMA)." At the campaign's head was Dr.
Horatio Robinson Storer, a Boston gynecologist and surgeon." The
success of this campaign was such that, within a quarter century of
its inception, nearly every jurisdiction (including the District of
Columbia) had enacted a statute criminalizing abortion from
conception onward.4"
Physicians, the most common abortion defendants in the
twentieth century, and among the foremost proponents of its
decriminalization (thus the familiar refrain 'a choice between a
woman and her doctor'), had engaged in a virulent campaign to
outlaw the practice scarcely a century earlier. In fact, this
campaign arose out of questionably self-interested motives,
presented a somewhat fanciful view of 'scientific' embryology, and
relied on rather predictable appeals to gendered and ethnic animus.
1. Motivations behind the campaign
While the medical campaign against abortion reflected the
legitimate moral and social beliefs of its participants, another more
practical motivation is apparent. The formation of the AMA
represented a concerted effort on the part of rigorously trained
graduates of elite allopathic medical schools to restrict the medical
franchise to themselves." Prior to this time, 'regulars,' as these
physicians were known, faced virtually unrestrained competition
from homeopaths, faith healers, midwives, and self- or apprenticeship-
trained practitioners. Collectively, these latter groups were known
as 'irregulars."7
Competition was particularly fierce in the arena of reproductive
medicine, to which scientific obstetrics and gynecology were fledgling
latecomers." Most women employed midwives for their obstetrical
needs, and in some cases those needs extended to abortion.49
Obstetrician/gynecologists sought to demarginalize themselves
within the medical profession, where even the most learned among
them were referred to as 'professors of midwifery.'50 Indeed, their
43. Id.
44. Id. at 11.
45. Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective of Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 279-80 (1992).
46. REAGAN, supra note 41, at 10-11.
47. Id. at 11.
48. Siegel, supra note 45, at 283.
49. Id. at 283-84.
50. Id.
2004]
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moral status in the community at large was often suspect because
these were men who made a profession of examining female genitalia.51
Despite reservations that they might have had about their
colleagues' choice of specialty, regular physicians as a whole united
with obstetrician/gynecologists in attempts to wrest control of
reproductive medicine from irregulars.' Partially because it concerned
a significant area of competition, this struggle was central to the
AMA's interests. Driving midwives out of business was beneficial
for all physicians because nearly every family was likely to need
reproductive medical services at some point.' The regulars feared
that families who regularly employed the neighborhood midwife
might, from habit or familiarity, turn to her as the first source of
treatment for any ailment.' By controlling reproductive medicine,
the AMA hoped to control the 'gateway' to medicine as a whole.5
Thus, for reasons that may have served business as much as morals
or public health, the medical anti-abortion movement proffered a
number of arguments grounded in contemporary scientific and
social beliefs.
2. The physiological argument
The canon law and common law views of abortion reflected both
women's understandings of their bodily functions6 and Judeo-
Greco-Christian religious understanding of natural philosophy. The
popular view of gestation comported with the maternal experience
of detecting a separate, involuntary movement within the womb at
a point approximately halfway through pregnancy." This moment,
at which the experience of pregnancy transformed from mere
physiological changes in the self to the direct experience of another,
independent actor within the body, marked a logical point at which
to draw the distinction between mother/child as a single entity and
mother and child as distinct entities.
Indeed, many women in a pre-scientific age may not have
recognized early gestation as pregnancy at all, but rather as a
period of 'blocked menses,' which was sometimes, but by no means
always, a precursor to quickening and true pregnancy.' The perceptional
51. REAGAN, supra note 41, at 12.
52. ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE 81 (1984).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. REAGAN, supra note 41, at 8.
57. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
58. REAGAN, supra note 41, at 8.
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disconnect between cessation of menstruation and the onset of
pregnancy is perhaps explainable by the frequency of spontaneous
early miscarriage, and the prevalence of true (i.e. non-gestational)
amenorrhea as a symptom of illness or malnutrition.59 Thus, when
some women took home preparations, and later patent medicines
- made up of pennyroyal, tansy, ergot, snakeroot, cotton root, or
savin (juniper extract) - it is possible that they did not conceptualize
them as abortifacients terminating pregnancies, but rather as
remedies that would bring on the menses' (i.e. cure their amenorrhea).°
As discussed in section IIA, legal and religious understandings
of abortion were premised on metaphysical notions of rational
ensoulment but dovetailed with popular understandings of the body
in that they adopted quickening as the moment of delineation. Not
surprisingly, organized medicine, which saw itself as a scientific
movement at odds with folk or religious natural philosophy, set
about attacking these traditional understandings of gestation.61 The
medical movement dismissed quickening as lacking scientific
significance s2 and ensoulment theory as 'metaphysical speculation.' It
sought instead to introduce contemporary embryology as the model by
which fetal rights should be determined.
Autonomous life, the movement argued, began at conception,
because at that point the embryo possessed an independent
capacity for growth.' The fact that a fetus was generally not viable
before seven months did not matter to Dr. James Whitmire, who
proclaimed that "[tihe truly professional man's morals... are not
of that easy caste, because he sees in the germ the probable embryo,
in the embryo the rudimentary foetus, and in that, the seven
months viable child and the prospective living, moving, breathing
man or woman."' Furthermore, because the embryo was attached
to the mother only by the umbilicus, and then only via the placenta,
the movement argued that the embryo was in a scientific sense an
independent being."
This notion of physical and moral disconnect from the mother
was crucial to the movement's proffered explanation of gestation.
Storer announced that an unfertilized egg "may perhaps be
59. Id. at 8-9.
60. Id. at 9.
61. Siegel, supra note 45, at 288.
62. REAGAN, supra note 41, at 12.
63. Siegel, supra note 45, at 288.
64. Id.
65. James S. Whitmire, Criminal Abortion, 31 CHI. MED. J. 385, 392 (1874), quoted in
Siegel, supra note 45, at 291.
66. Siegel, supra note 45, at 288.
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considered as a part and parcel" of a woman before conception, "but
not afterwards.' 7 He compared the embryo to a nursing infant,
asserting that:
This is no fanciful analogy; its truth is proved by countless facts.
In the kangaroo, for instance, the offspring is born into the
world at an extremely early stage of development.., and then
is placed by the mother in an external, abdominal, or marsupial
pouch, to portions of which corresponding, so far as function
goes, at once to teats and to the uterine sinuses, these embryos
cling by an almost vascular connection, until they are
sufficiently advanced to bear detachment, or in reality to be
born .... The first impregnation of the egg, whether in man or
in kangaroo, is the birth of the offspring to life; its emergence
into the outside world for wholly separate existence is, for one
as for the other, but an accident in time.ss
The physiological picture of gestation presented by the nineteenth-
century medical anti-abortion movement was a systematic attempt to
discredit the popular and religious understanding of the fetus as one
with its mother throughout pregnancy and not uniquely human
until the moment of quickening. Instead, the movement sought to
substitute a view of a protected, miniature (usually male) adult,
who, though he appears at first as "the invisible product of
conception," inevitably"develop[s], grows, passes through the embryonic
and foetal stages of existence, appears as the breathing and lovely
infant, the active, the intelligent boy, the studious moral youth, the
adult man, rejoicing in the plenitude of his corporeal strength and
intellectual powers, capable of moral and spiritual enjoyments." 9
In an age when science was worshiped almost as a new
religion, the practitioners of a scientific profession were at a distinct
advantage in winning the public over to their cause. If its arguments
bent the finer points of biological understanding for a rhetorical
purpose, the physicians' movement doubtless felt this small
mendacity justified. Physicians likely reasoned that removing
irregulars from the practice of reproductive medicine was to
everyone's benefit because it resulted in the general substitution of
scientific healing for folk medicine.0 Victorian America had other
67. HORATIO ROBINSON STORER, WHY NOT? A BOOK FOR EVERY WOMAN 17 (Boston, Lee
& Shepard 1866), quoted in Siegel, supra note 45, at 289.
68. Id. at 29-30, quoted in Siegel, supra note 45, at 289-90.
69. HUGH HODGE, FOETICIDE, OR CRIMINAL ABORTION 25 (Lindsay & Blakiston 1869),
quoted in Siegel, supra note 45, at 290.
70. PETCHESKY, supra note 52, at 81 (discussing regular physicians).
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preoccupations, however, and it was to these that the anti-abortion
movement next appealed.
3. The social order argument
Abortion, its medical critics urged, threatened to undermine the
social order because it distracted women from their physiologically
determined roles as wives and mothers and made them easier prey
for the misguided proponents of feminism. 1 Women selfishly sought
abortions, it was argued, "to avoid the labor and the expense of
rearing children, and the interference with pleasurable pursuits,
fashions, and frivolities," and by doing so chose "an indolent, selfish
life, neglecting the work God ha[d] appointed [them] to perform.""8
The physicians' anti-abortion movement was openly hostile to
the feminist movement, which the physicians' movement saw as
promoting female abandonment of maternal duty:
"Woman's rights" now are understood to be, that she should be
a man, and that her physical organism, which is constituted by
Nature to bear and rear offspring, should be left in abeyance,
and that her ministrations in the formation of character as
mother should be abandoned for the sterner rights of voting and
law making.74
Indeed, the notions of reproductive choice and electoral choice
were conflated by members of the movement who warned that
women sought not only to vote for political leaders, but also to 'elect'
how many children they would have.75 Although the nineteenth
century feminist movement was almost monolithic in its opposition
to abortion, which it viewed as an evil forced upon women by lustful
husbands and deceitful suitors,7" the anti-abortion movement
nonetheless blamed feminists for tacitly encouraging abortion
through engendering an illicit desire to shirk female responsibilities."
71. See Siegel, supra note 45, at 302-02 (discussing the connection between abortion
and social issues about women).
72. ANDREW NEBINGER, CRIMINAL ABoRrIoN; ITS EXTENT AND PREvFNTION 11 (Collins
1876), quoted in Siegel, supra note 45, at 302.
73. AuGusTus K. GARDNER, CONJUGAL SINS AGAINST THE LAws OF LIFE AND HEALTH
225 (J.S. Redfield 1870), quoted in Siegel, supra note 45, at 303.
74. Montrose A. Pallen, Foeticide, or Criminal Abortion, 3 MED. ARCHIVES 193, 205
(1869), quoted in Siegel, supra note 45, at 303-304.
75. Siegel, supra note 45, at 304.
76. REAGAN, supra note 41, at 12.
77. Siegel, supra note 45, at 303.
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The rhetorical genius of the anti-abortion movement's attack on
feminism was its success in turning feminist arguments about
marriage and sexual morality precisely on their heads. Nineteenth
century feminism advocated 'voluntary motherhood,' which essentially
meant female control of marital sexuality.7' The classical legal
understanding of marriage bestowed on the husband rights to his
wife's labor and sexuality, in exchange for his duty of support. 9 The
feminist movement saw this arrangement as little better than
legalized prostitution.' Further, it argued, the approach to sexuality
that society imposed on females -chastity until marriage, monogamy
afterwards - was morally superior to the standard it tacitly
approved for males - lifelong patronization of (actual) prostitutes
and marital infidelity. 1
The anti-abortion movement reversed this rhetoric, lobbing it
back at its source with Dr. Horatio Storer's charge that women who
aborted (and thus, presumably, many feminists) committed a sin of
precisely equal gravity as men who visited prostitutes.82 Indeed,
abortion further threatened female morality, it was argued, because
it threatened female chastity and thus every family's interests in
descent.8 While the medical anti-abortion movement was directed
primarily at married women, the charge that abortion permitted
unmarried women to have sex was also of importance.' With the
availability of abortion, female chastity could not so easily "be
enforced with severe social and legal sanctions, among which fear
of pregnancy function[s] effectively and naturally. "S
The medical anti-abortion movement further appropriated the
'legalized prostitution' metaphor, arguing that it was marriage
without child bearing, rather than 'ordinary' marriage, which gave
rise to this condition.86 The physicians argued that "so long as man's
natural sexual urge [sic] were allowed expression in marriage
without reproductive consequence,' 7 marriage represented legalized
prostitution. Thus, "the very aspiration to avoid maternity [was] an
expression of unnatural egoism or immoral license."" Indeed, at
78. REAGAN, supra note 41, at 12.
79. Siegel, supra note 45, at 305.
80. Id. at 308.
81. REAGAN, supra note 41, at 12.
82. Id.
83. PETCHESKY, supra note 52, at 82.
84. REAGAN, supra note 41, at 12.
85. LINDA GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WoMAN's RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH
CONTROL IN AMERICA 261 (1976), quoted in PETCHESKY, supra note 52, at 82.
86. Siegel, supra note 45, at 308.
87. Id. at 309 (emphasis in original).
88. Id. at 310.
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least one physician implied that not only might feminism cause the
evil of abortion, abortion might cause the evil of feminism89 William
Goodell argued that women engaging in contraception or abortion
turned to feminism because
[tihe sexual instinct has been given to man for the perpetuation
of the species.... Dissociate one from the other, and... wedlock
lapses into licentiousness; the wife is degraded into a mistress
... [and she] takes distorted views of life and of the marriage
relation, and harbors resentment against her husband as the
author of all her ills.'
The elite physicians who led the anti-abortion campaign of the
nineteenth century were predominantly American-born men of
English and German lineage.91 Given the social concerns of the
time, it is understandable that their arguments should also play on
'native' fear of immigrant elements. 92 Fertility among the native-
born, Protestant classes had declined relative to that of
immigrants by 1850, and some attributed this disparity to the
disproportionate practice of abortion among native-born women. 9a
One year after the surrender at Appomattox, Storer asked his
readers whether "the fertile savannas of the South, now
disinthralled [sic] and first made habitable by freemen... [would]
be filled by our own children or by those of aliens?"94 At the same
time as "gaps in our population.., have late been made by disease
and the sword ... the great territories of the far West ... offer
homes for countless millions yet unborn," he mused, and charged
that the ethnic makeup of those future Americans was "a question
that our own women must answer; upon their loins depends the
future destiny of the nation."r
This fear of ethnic outnumbering was widespread among the
anti-abortionists. Augustus Gardner dedicated his tract "[tlo the
Reverend Clergy of the United States who by example and instruction
have the power to arrest the rapid extinction of the Native
American People."' It was explicitly political, as attested to by Dr.
89. Id. at 309.
90. William Goodell, Clinical Lecture on Conjugal Onanism and Kindred Sins, PHILA.
MED. TnMEs, Feb. 1, 1872, at 161, quoted in Siegel, supra note 45, at 309.
91. PETCHESKY, supra note 52, at 83.
92. REAGAN, supra note 41, at 11.
93. Id.
94. STORER, supra note 67, at 85, quoted in Siegel, eupra note 45, at 299.
95. Id.
96. GARDNER, supra note 73, at 5, quoted in Siegel, supra note 45, at 298.
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H.S. Pomeroy's observation that "our voters - and so our
lawmakers and rulers, indirectly, if not directly - come more and
more from the lowest class, because that class is able and willing to
have children, while the so-called better classes seem not to be."'
Thus, the anti-abortion movement successfully exploited
Victorian concerns about the effect of sexual and reproductive
control on women's propensity to violate social norms and shirk
prescribed maternal duties.9" It effectively appropriated the
rhetoric of the nineteenth century feminist movement, forcing its
idiom through the looking glass of moral blame, and accusing
feminists of the very licentiousness they attributed to men." As the
movement attacked the women of its members' own social and
ethnic class for their behavior, it likewise sought to persuade them
that all class members should unite against the common enemy of
immigrant domination."°
Much like the rest of the nation, the District of Columbia had
inherited a common law abortion view drawn on centuries of
personal, religious, and philosophical understandings of pregnancy
and the body. Yet just seven decades after the creation of the
District, it bowed to a self-interested pressure group's quasi-scientific,
anti-feminist, and anti-immigrant campaign to ban abortion. During a
brief period of home rule, the District's legislature passed a
prohibition that would drive its women and its abortion providers
underground for over 100 years.
III. ABORTION STATUTES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
A. The Law Prior To 1872
At the time of its creation in 1800, the District of Columbia was
subject to existing Maryland and Virginia statutes, and, if not
superceded, to pre-1776 English common law and statutes in force
prior to 1776.10' The common law understanding of abortion was
97. H. S. POMEROY, THE ETHICS OF MARRIAGE 39 (New York, Funk & Wagnalls 1888),
quoted in Siegel, supra note 45, at 298.
98. Siegel, supra note 45, at 303.
99. REAGAN, supra note 41, at 12.
100. Id. at 11.
101. History of the D.C. Code, in D.C. CODE 1 (2001 Ed.). Although comprising a unified
political entity, the District's two counties were subject to different laws. Id. Washington
County, the land east of the Potomac River ceded by Maryland, was subject to Maryland
law; Alexandria County, the land west of the Potomac River ceded by Virginia, was subject
to Virginia law. Id. When Alexandria County was retroceded to Virginia in 1847, Virginia
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apparently sufficient for the District; no mention of abortion
appears in the first compilation of D.C. laws (the 'Cranch Code') or
in the municipal ordinances of the City of Washington."°
In 1855, an Act of Congress called for the creation of a code for
the District to be approved by a popular vote of District residents.'
0 '
Chapter 130, sections fifteen through seventeen of the code would
have provided D.C.'s first abortion statute.'0 The language is
somewhat akin to the common law pre- versus post-quickening
standard,'0 but potentially ambiguous:
Sec. 15. Any physician or other person who shall administer to
any woman pregnant with a quick child, any medicine, drug, or
substance whatever, or shall use any instrument or other means
with intent to destroy such child, shall, in case of the death of
such child or mother in consequence thereof, be imprisoned in
the penitentiary not less than two nor more than ten years.
Sec. 16. Any physician or person who shall willfully administer
to any pregnant woman, any medicine, drug, or substance
whatever, or use any instrument or other means, with the intent
thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, shall, upon
conviction, be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not
less than one nor more than five years.
Sec. 17. No person shall be punished by reason of any act
mentioned in the two sections immediately preceding, where
such act is done in good faith, with the intention of saving the
life of such woman or child."0 '
Precisely what distinction the drafters sought to create between
section fifteen and section sixteen is uncertain. 7 Literally read, the
sections criminalize both attempted and successful pre-quickening
abortion, but only successful post-quickening abortion.' °" This
reading seems problematic because the greater penalty for post-
law ceased to apply anywhere within the District of Columbia.
102. See generally W. CRANCH, ED., CODE OF LAWS FOR THE DisTmCr OF COLUMBIA
(Washington, Davis & Force 1819); LAWS OF THE CORPORATION OF TME CITY OF WASHINGTON
('Washington, De Krafft 1833); 1 CORPORATION LAWS OF THE CITY OF WASHINGTON
(Washington, Waters 1853).
103. Act of Mar. 4, 1855, ch. CLXX1V 10 Stat. 642.
104. ROBERT OULD & WILLIAM B. B. CROSS, EDS., REVISED CODE OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA 516 (1857) (citing D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-17).
105. See discussion supra Part H.
106. OULD & CROSS, supra note 104, at 516.
107. See id.
10. See id.
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quickening abortion suggests that the drafters believed it the more
serious crime. " It is therefore unlikely that theywould have excused its
attempt, while criminalizing unsuccessful pre-quickening abortions.1 0
It is plausible that, taken together with section fifteen,
'pregnant' in section sixteen implies quickening."' Under this
reading, pre-quickening abortion would be no crime; post-quickening
abortion would be criminal, and the penalties would differ for
completion and attempt."2 This ambiguity would doubtless have
proven fruit for vigorous judicial construction, but the proposed
code was never ratified, and abortion in D.C. would remain subject
to the common law for another fifteen years.1
B. The 1872 Act
In 1872, the short-lived Legislative Assembly for the District of
Columbia passed a comprehensive abortion prohibition."4 Section
one provides that
[amny person who shall administer, or cause to be administered,
to any woman in any condition of pregnancy, any medication,
drug, substance, or thing whatsoever, with the intention thereby
to produce a miscarriage ... or shall use on any such woman
any instruments, or any other means for said purposes, shall, in
case of the death of said woman... or in case of the death of the
child therefrom, beguilty of manslaughter, and be punished... by
imprisonment at hard labor... for a period of not less than four
no more than seven years, and be fined in a sum not exceeding
one thousand dollars." 5
The differences between the 1857 and the 1872 statutes are
significant. First, the quickening distinction is abolished; the prohibition
applies to abortions "in any condition of pregnancy."'1 6 Second, the
law explicitly equates abortion with homicide, rendering the abortion
provider guilty of manslaughter, not the separate crime of abortion. 1"
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. History of the D.C. Code, supra note 101, at 8.
114. See generally ACTS & RESOLUTIONS OF THE SPECIAL SESSIONS OF THE FIRST
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLYOF TE DISTUCTOFCOLUMBIA 26 (Chronicle 1872) [hereinafer ACTS
& RESOLUTIONS].
115. 1d. at 26-27 (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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Section two provides somewhat lesser penalties for aiders and
abettors, but defines these categories widely, to sweep in not only
procurers and assistants, but also anyone who chooses to "advise,
direct, or counsel" abortion, or even merely "countenance or
approve"" ' the procedure. It is conceivable that attempted abortion
might be prosecutable under this section's broad language." 9
Section three provides a life-of-the-mother exception, with an
additional requirement that at least one other physician concur in
the decision. 20 Sections four and five prohibit the sale of
abortifacients except on the written prescription of a licensed
"graduated" physician,121 and require that pharmacists keep a
separate register of all such dispensations. 22 Section six forbids the
advertisement of abortifacients, although it cleverly avoids the
appearance of prior restraint by providing a five day notice
requirement before charges may be brought.'2 Section seven
requires the District Coroner to analyze all suspected abortifacients
and abortion instruments whenever there is suspicion of an
abortion.'2 Section eight permits co-conspirators in abortion to
testify against one another and provides both civil and criminal
immunity to such testimony. 12
C. Section 22-201
In 1901, all previous D.C. statutes were superceded by the
CongressionalAct to Establisha Code of Law for the Distct ofColumbia'
The 1901 code pared the 1872 Act down to a singie paragraph:
SEC. 809. PROCURING MISCARRIAGE.- Whoever, with intent to
procure the miscarriage of any woman, prescribes or
administers to her any medicine, drug, or substance whatever,
or with like intent uses any instrument or means, unless when
necessary to preserve her life or health and under the direction
of a competent licensed practitioner of medicine, shall be
118. Id.
119. Id. at 27.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 27-28.
123. Id. at 28.
124. Id. at 28-29.
125. Id. at 29.
126. District of Columbia Code, 56th Cong. ch. 854, 31 Stat. 1189 (1901).
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imprisoned for not more than five years; or if the woman or her
child dies in consequence of such act, by imprisonment for not
less than three nor more than twenty years. 12"
The 1901 code thus adopted the 1872 statute's from-conception
prohibition." It retained the life-of-the-mother exemption and
added a health exemption. 129 It eliminated the complex regulation
of pharmacists, although presumably the unauthorized sale of
abortifacients was proscribed by the "administers.. . unless...
under the direction of" language.' It reintroduced the statutory
distinction between attempted and completed abortion and it
imposed quite a severe maximum penalty on the latter: twenty
years, as opposed to only seven under the 1872 Act.13'
Section 802, recodified as Section 22-201 in 1940,132 persisted
in this form until 1953. In that year, Congress passed the District
of Columbia Law Enforcement Act of 1953." As part of this Act,
Section 22-201 was amended to read:
Whoever, by means of any instrument, medicine, drug or other
means whatever, procures or produces, orattempts toprocure or
produce an abortion or miscarriage on any woman, unless the
same were done as necessary for the preservation of the mother's
life or health and under the direction of a competent licensed
practitioner of medicine, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary
not less than one year or not more than ten years; or if the death
of the mother results therefrom, the person... shall be guilty of
second degree murder.1"
As indicated, this statute eliminates the distinction between
attempted and completed abortion, and thereby raises the maximum
penalty for the former, while lowering the maximum penalty for the
latter.1" It also dramatically increases the consequences of killing
the patient."6 While earlier laws had recognized patient death as
127. Id. § 809 (recodified at D.C. CODEANN. § 22-201 (1940))(current version at D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-101 (2001)).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. id.; ACTS & RESOLUTIONS, supra note 114, at 24.
132. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1940).
133. District of Columbia Law Enforcement Act of 1953,83 Pub. L. No. 85, § 203,67 Stat.
90 (codified as amended at D.C. Code §22-201 (1966)) (current version at D.C. CODE ANN. §
22-101(2001)).
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. id.
136. Id.
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essentially an aggravating circumstance of abortion, the 1953
statute labels the hapless abortion provider as murderer, regardless
of his or her actual intent, and without even a showing of recklessness
in performing the operation.13' An earlier version of the 1953 Act
would have removed the health-of-the-mother exception, but this
provision was abandoned for reasons which are not apparent from
the legislative history.'
Section 22-201, later recodified as Section 22-101,* 9 remained
in force as amended until rendered unconstitutional in 1973 by Roe
v. Wade." Curiously, it has never been repealed, and remains in
the current D.C. Code."1 While its survival might superficially
suggest oversight, it is notable that a typographical error within the
text of the 1953 Act's abortion section was corrected by the D.C.
Council in 1989, as part of a Technical Amendments Act that eliminated
numerous other obsolete sections. 2 Three decades into its obsolescence,
Section 22-101 remains the first offense enumerated in D.C.'s criminal
code, a vestigial reminder of a century of criminalized abortion.
III. THE EXPERIENCE OF CRIMINAL ABORTION IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA AS REFLECTED IN THE REPORTED CASES
Abortion is by its nature private, and countless thousands
doubtlessly took place without record during the District's century of
prohibition. Where, however, the private act of abortion was forced
into public view by a criminal prosecution, judicial opinions provide
an historical window into this illegal practice. Appellate records are
imperfect sources of history for numerous reasons. Facts are
subordinated to law, and only those relevant to the issues on appeal
need be reported. Appealed cases are by no means representative of
all cases brought - the stories of those defendants who pled guilty,
were acquitted, or lacked financial means to appeal left no mark on
the published case reports. Even given these limitations, the
reported cases permit a rare glimpse into the social, practical, and
legal troubles faced by participants in the shadow world of
criminal abortion.
137. Id.
138. Hearing on the District of Columbia Law Enforcement Act Before the House Comm.
on the District of Columbia, 83d Cong. 55, 57 (1954) (statement of Hon. Samuel Spencer,
Comm'r, District of Columbia), microformed on CIS no. 83 HD-T.13 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
139. D.C. CODE ANN.§ 22-101 (1973).
140. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
141. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-101 (2001).
142. Technical Amendments Act of 1988, preamble, § 28, 36 D.C. Reg. 492 (codified as
amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-101 (2001)).
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The D.C. reported cases1' concern twenty-one charged abortions
or attempts of abortion, although a number of cases refer to
additional abortions as evidence of the charged abortion or other
offenses.'" Of these twenty-one abortions, six allegedly resulted in
the death of the patient. 4 ' Of twenty-nine identifiable defendants,
twenty-one were accused of performing abortions themselves, and
five of aiding and abetting as go-betweens, assistants, or, in one
case, the paramour of the patient.' 46 Twenty-one defendants were
143. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971); Laughlin v. United States, 344 F.2d
187 (1965); Copes v. United States, 345 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Wayne v. United States,
318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Hunt v. United States, 301 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Bush
v. United States, 301 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Hopkins v. United States, 275 F.2d 155
(D.C. Cir. 1960); Agee v. United States, 248 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1957); McAllister v. United
States, 239 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Brown v. United States, 239 F.2d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
Harper v. United States, 239 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Peckham v. United States, 226
F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir.1954); Spriggs
v. United States, 205 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Goodloe v. United States, 188 F.2d 621
(D.C. Cir. 1951); Miller v. United States, 169 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Williams v. United
States, 138 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Hart v. United States, 105 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1939);
Crichton v. United States, 92 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Harrod v. United States, 29 F.2d
454 (D.C. Cir. 1928); Kemp v. Board of Medical Supervisors, 46 App. D.C. 173 (D.C. Cir.
1917); Kemp v. United States, 41 App. D.C. 539 (D.C. Cir. 1914); Thompson v. United
States, 30 App. D.C. 352 (D.C. Cir. 1908); Maxey v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 63 (D.C.
Cir. 1907); United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd 402 U.S.
62 (1971); United States v. Vincent, 292 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1968); United States v.
Harper 137 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1956), affld 239 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1956); In re Quantz 106
F. Supp. 557 (D.D.C. 1952); Warren v. United States, 310 A.2d 228 (D.C. 1973). Citations
to historical District of Columbia cases can be confusing due to the shifting jurisdiction
of 'state' law between local and federal courts and the inconsistent duplication of citation
forms. At various points in the twentieth century, trial jurisdiction of D.C. 'state' criminal
offenses was held by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
(D.D.C.), the trial term of the now-defunct Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
(D.C.), and the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (D.C. Super. Ct.). Before the
creation of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (D.C.) in 1970, both 'state' and
federal appeals were taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit (D.C. Cir.) and its predecessor, the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia (D.C. Cir.). See THE BLUEBOOKm A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 196-97
(Columbia Law Review Ass'n et a]. eds., 17th ed. 2000).
144. See cases cited supra note 143.
145. Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963), Hopkins v. United States,
275 F.2d 155 (D.C. Cir. 1960), Spriggs v. United States, 205 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1953),
Hart v. United States, 105 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1939) Maxey v. United States, 30 App. D.C.
63 (D.C. Cir. 1907), and Warren v. United States, 310 A.2d 228 (D.C. 1973).
146. Laughlin v. United States, 344 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Copes v. United States,
345 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Hunt v. United States, 301 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Hopkins v. United States, 275 F.2d
155 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Agee v. United States, 248 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1957); McAllister v.
United States, 239 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Harper v. United States, 239 F.2d 945 (D.C.
Cir. 1956); Peckham v. United States, 226 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Peckham v. United
States, 210 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir.1954); Spriggs v. United States, 205 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir.
1953); Goodloe v. United States, 188 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Miller v. United States,
169 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Ladreyv. United States, 155 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Hart
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male; eight were female.' 47 Of the twenty-one alleged principal
abortion providers, eleven were identified as medical doctors, seven
were identified as non-physicians, and three were not identifiable
by qualification.'48
A. Abortion Narratives
Amid the legal analysis, the reported cases contain some
compelling, first hand accounts of illegal abortion as experienced by
patients, providers, and police in the District of Columbia. It was
apparently a world fraught with dangers: arrest and imprisonment
for the provider, morbidity or death for the patient. Even if such
risks did not manifest themselves, surely the secrecy - the code
names, the intermediaries, and the anonymous offices - weighed
heavily on all the parties, forced as they were into this underworld
by a legal regime that excoriated their conduct.
Sadie Volk was a domestic cook who found herself three
months pregnant in October of 1905.'49 She later told a court that
she went to the house of the defendant... and was shown into
his office. She inquired of defendant, who was alone, if he
operated. He said "Yes," and that he would perform the
operation. He then inquired how long she had been pregnant,
and her answer was "three months." He caused her to recline on
a sofa in the office, lifted her clothes, and performed an operation on
her. She could not see what he did. He operated about ten minutes.
She paid him $15, and he told her if the operation did not have
effect to return on the third day thereafter."5
Three days later, a Dr. McKay (presumably a "regular" physician)
was summoned to Sadie's house where
[He] found her in her room, in bed, covered with clothes and
soaked with blood. Found membrane projecting from her vagina
which meant that a child had recently been brought forth. He
v. United States, 105 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Crichton v. United States, 92 F.2d 224
(D.C. Cir. 1937); Harrod v. United States, 29 F.2d 454 (D.C. Cir. 1928); Thompson v.
United States, 30 App. D.C. 352 (D.C. Cir. 1908); Maxey v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 63
(D.C. Cir. 1907);United States v. Vincent, 292 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1968); United States
v. Harper 137 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1956), aftd 239 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1956); In re Quantz
106 F. Supp. 557 (D.D.C. 1952); Warren v. United States, 310 A.2d 228 (D.C. 1973).
147. See cases cited supra note 143.
148. See cases cited supra note 143.
149. Thompson v. United States, 30 App. D.C 352, 353-56 (D.C. Cir. 1908).
150. Id. at 354.
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examined into her condition. She told him that her baby was
under the bed, and he found it there. She showed symptons [sic]
of having absorbed some poison, and he had her conveyed to the
hospital for treatment. The foetus was seven or eight inches long
and without life in it. She was apparently a stout, robust
woman, and he saw nothing to indicate the necessity of an
operation to produce a miscarriage in order to save her life.151
Claudia Parrish was only sixteen years old when she became
pregnant by Paul Meagher in 1906.152 She was initially uncertain
about the cause of her missed menstrual periods;" her doctor
attributed them to a cold and gave her "some simple remedy.""'
Her sister May suggested Hunyadi Water.1" When Claudia's
condition became more obvious, May wrote to Meagher, telling him
that "it is up to you to do something."1" May would later testify that
by "do something," she meant that Meagher would either marry
Claudia, or come forward and admit the pregnancy to her father -
she "did not expect anything more.
"157
Nevertheless, May accompanied Claudia to meet Meagher at
Seventh Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, from whence they
rode the streetcar to G Street, SW.' 5s
Claudia was crying on the way. Meagher told them they should
tell "Mrs. Pierce" that Claudia was married, and that "Mrs.
Rock" had sent them to her. He showed them the house of "Mrs.
Pierce," which was No. 41 G Street, S. W. He said he would not
go past the house with them, because she would think detectives
were watching her. Just before getting to the house he got
behind a woodpile at the corner, and stood there. He gave
Claudia $10. "Mrs. Maxey" answered the knock at the door, and
said she supposed she was the person looked for. She asked if
the visit was about "abortion business." She told them to sit
down, as she had a patient in the back room. Returning she
asked them if they knew "Mrs. Rock," and they said yes. She
said she did not see why Claudia should not get over it, and said
she had had many patients. Finally she took Claudia up stairs.
151. Id. at 354-55.
152. Maxey v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 63, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1907).
153. Id. at 66.
154. Id. at 70.
155. Id. at 66. Hunyadi water was the bottled product of a well in Budapest, and the
subject of a patent dispute that reached the United States Supreme Court. See Saxlehner v.
Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19 (1900).
156. Maxey, 30 App. D.C. at 67.
157. Id
158. Id. at 65.
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She came down in about twenty minutes, with a towel in her
hands that showed blood upon it. Holding it up she said it was
unusual to get so much blood the first time. She gave Claudia
some medicine, and told her to return the day after to-morrow.
She said there was a possibility that Claudia might have to go
to bed, and that she knew a "colored lady" who would take her
in ff she got sick; would find out and let her know [when Claudia
returned] .... [Claudia and May] left and met Meagher on the
corner, and told him what had occurred. He asked if she
inquired if they knew "Mrs. Rock," and they said yes, and that
they told the woman they knew "Mrs. Rock7 very well, and also
that Claudia was married. He asked ff the money was sufficient,
and if Claudia was coming again. He was told that the money was
sufficient, and that Claudia was to return on Wednesday. He rode
part of the way home with them, furnishing the car tickets. i5 9
The night of the abortion (Monday), Claudia had "two chills."160
By Tuesday night she was very sick, and by Wednesday she could
barely walk. On Thursday morning, she dragged herself to the
Riggs Hotel, where May worked as a telephone operator.'6 1 May
sent her immediately by carriage to Columbia Hospital.1 6 There,
the following morning, 'Mrs. Pierce's' treatment had its intended
effect; despite the surgical resident's efforts to prevent miscarriage,
a four-month fetus was delivered lifeless at 11:00 a.m. 163 Mrs.
Pierce's catheter, however, had brought with it something else:
"puerperal septicaemia."'6 4 That night, Claudia became delirious. 5
Over the next three days, Claudia's temperature reached 105
degrees, and her pulse rose at times to 160 beats per minute.' As
her condition worsened, an inflammatory mass larger than the
surgeon's fist protruded from her uterus. 167 Despite an operation to
drain the uterus, Claudia died on the morning of June 27, 1906.66
On the advice of a 'contact,' Mr. and Mrs. Carl Meinardus
traveled from Brooklyn, New York to Washington, D.C. in
December of 1967.169 As instructed, they checked into the Skyline
159. Id. at 65-66.
160. Id. at 66.
161. Id.
162. Id
163. Id at 67.
164. Id This term is sufficiently non-specific as to be obsolete in modem medical usage.
A possible modern diagnosis given the history and symptoms would be chorioamniitis.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 68.
168. Id.
169. United States v. Vincent, 292 F. Supp. 729, 730 (D.D.C. 1968).
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Inn at South Capitol and I Streets, SW, and telephoned 'Mary' at
554-4849.17o 'Mary' arrived for Mrs. Meinardus in a taxi the
following afternoon, and took her to 1425 Fourth Street, SW,
apartment A-505. 7' They were greeted by a man who identified
himself as 'Dr. Ewing' (actually Thomas Phillip Martini, who had
been convicted of criminal abortion in 1957 and arrested again on
that charge in 1966).172 'Dr. Ewing' gave Mrs. Meinardus several
pills and injections, and then took her into a bedroom that had been
outfitted with a gynecologist's examination table."7 3 Mrs. Meinardus
placed her legs in the stirrups, and the 'doctor' began the
procedure. 74 'Mary' returned Mrs. Meinardus to the Skyline Inn
that evening; she had been gone approximately six and one half
hours.'75 Although it was late, the Meinarduses drove the 230
miles back to Brooklyn that night. 17 The next morning, Mrs.
Meniardus suffered severe cramps and was admitted to Community
Hospital in Brooklyn, where she was listed in critical condition due
to a septic abortion. 177 While sixty years of medical progress since
Claudia Parrish's death saved Mrs. Meinardus's life, it could not
save her fertility." Antibiotics controlled the infection, but she
underwent a hysterectomy to remove her destroyed womb.
79
Six decades separate the abortions of Claudia Parrish and Mrs.
Meinardus, but the experience of criminal abortion did not change
significantly over that period. A universe of clandestine contacts,
pseudonyms, anonymous buildings, and the potential for medical
complications still awaited any woman seeking to terminate a
pregnancy outside the limited purview of medically sanctioned abortion.
B. Legal Disability And Ordeal In The Courts
District of Columbia courts, in truth, posed no direct threat to
abortion patients as potential defendants. No reported District of
Columbia case involves the prosecution of a patient. 8 0 By 1908,
courts explicitly interpreted the language of section 809 of the
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See cases cited supra note 143.
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District of Columbia Code' (later section 22-201) as applying only
to the abortion provider.' Although a patient was formally viewed
as a "victim, rather than an accomplice,""' her standing in court
was often significantly tainted by virtue of her abortion.
In at least one case, evidence that a witness had undergone the
abortion about which she testified was deemed a proper bad act for
impeachment of her credibility.' The trial judge in Thomspson
instructed the jury that "according to the testimony of Sadie Volk,
while she is not an accomplice, strictly speaking, inasmuch as, from
her own evidence, she morally implicates herself in the act, the jury
should consider that circumstance as bearing on her credibility.""a
Because patients often provided the strongest evidence against
their clients, defense attorneys in abortion cases had strong
incentives to target them for character assassination. In the trial of
Dr. Henry Peckham, Jr., defense counsel Dorsey Offutt attempted
to introduce evidence that Mary Ott, the complaining witness, had
received psychiatric treatment at Bethesda Naval Hospital, and had
undergone a string of earlier, unrelated abortions." Offutt also
subpoenaed Ott's mother 87 who, although unable to provide any
relevant testimony, was forced to travel from Erie, Pennsylvania
and listen to her daughter describe her abortion in open court." He
also asked Ott, "When were you arrested in this case?"' 9 This was
a clearly disingenuous question intended to prejudice the jury since
181. D.C. CODE ANN. § 809 (1901).
182. Thompson v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 352, 362-63 (D.C. Cir. 1908) (noting the
similar construction of statutes in Massachusetts, New Jersey, Kentucky, Minnesota,
and Texas).
183. Id. at 363.
184. Id. at 362.
185. Id. at 362-63. The taint of abortion on credibility also seems to have applied to
physicians and attorneys. In Mostyn v. United States, 64 F.2d 145, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1933), the
government called a physician who had examined the victim of a police assault. The victim
had apparently been referred to the physician by his attorney, and the defense attempted to
impeach the physician with evidence that the attorney had represented him during a
previous grand jury abortion investigation. Id.
186. Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1954) [hereinafter
Peckham 1].
187. Much of this account is drawn from Offutt v. United States, 208 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.
1953), rev'd 348 U.S. 11 (1954). Offutt falls within an interesting line of cases on criminal
contempt and the difficulties of securing fair adjudication by the same judge who makes
the initial finding. See also Offutt v. United States, 232 F.2d 69 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (appeal of
second contempt conviction on remand from Supreme Court). Peckham's conviction was
reversed partly on the basis of the antagonism with which the trial judge treated Offutt,
Peckhcam I, 210 F.2d at 702, but he was subsequently convicted at his new trial, and this
conviction was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Peckharm 1, 226 F.2d at 34.
188. Offutt, 208 F.2d at 843.
189. Id.
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arrest and prosecution of a patient were almost unknown in the
District of Columbia. 190
This sort of attempt to "besmirch a witness" 9' appears again
in In re Quantz, where the petitioner's trial counsel sought to
introduce evidence of the extramarital affair that had resulted in
the complaining witness's pregnancy.'90 Counsel also attempted to
question the witness about previous miscarriages and abortions,
about whether she had been completely naked when the abortion
was performed, and about "an alleged fight between [the witness]
and a Chinese woman."93
A patient injured by a negligently performed abortion was also
disadvantaged in the eyes of the court. Abortion's illegality necessarily
precluded recovery under a breach of contract theory, because
contracts concerning illegal acts are generally unenforceable. The
moral taint of the plaintiff's abortion also denied recovery under a
tort theory in the D.C. case of Hunter v. Wheate.'" The court refused to
sustain an action arising "ex turpi causa,"'95 finding it "hardly
necessary to say that in voluntarily participating in the miscarriage
upon herself the appellee engaged, not only in an unlawful act, but
also in one which was immoral.""
C. Race
It is somewhat surprising that, given the District of Columbia's
history of segregation and racial discord, race does not play a
significant role in the District's reported abortion cases. Most cases
do not comment on the race of either provider or patient. A notable
exception, however, is Harrod v. United States, which expressed the
moral danger blacks posed to whites in the public imagination of
1928.19 The defendant, Amanda Harrod, was an "elderly colored
woman," convicted of performing, for a fee of $30, three surgical
treatments on Edna K Steinbrucker, resulting in a miscarriage.'
The police apparently interviewed Steinbrucker and her paramour
Jolliffe after "they had observed numerous young white couples
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 106 F. Supp. 557,559 (D.D.C. 1952).
193. Id. at 559-60.
194. 289 F. 604 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
195. Id. at 606 (quoting Higgins v. McCrea, 116 U.S. 671, 686 (1886)).
196. Id. at 606-07.
197. 29 F.2d 444,454 (D.C. Cir. 1928).
198. Id.
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going into [Harrod's] house and leaving after brief visits."1 99 Upon
entering the house, the police discovered "several white people in
the house [who] declared that they were there for similar treatments."2 °°
The fear that blacks were contributing to white corruption by
performing or aiding in the performance of abortions is alluded to
in Maxey, as the court apparently found it significant that Kate
Maxey promised to send Claudia Parrish to a "colored lady" for
nursing if the abortion made her sick. 01 Otherwise, race remains
absent from the judicial discussion of abortion in the District of
Columbia, albeit with the curious exception of Dr. Quantz's charge
that his patient had engaged in a fight with a "Chinese woman." °2
D. Governmental Targeting
While the local police seem to have enforced D.C.'s abortion
laws passively, by waiting for hospitals to report providers careless
or unfortunate enough to maim or kill their patients, on at least one
occasion, the United States Post Office Department employed a
sting operation to enforce its own federal statute.2 °3
On November 14, 1912, Postal Inspector James Woltz sent the
following letter from Concord, North Carolina, to Dr. Thomas J.
Kemp in his home office at 433 G. Street NW:
My Dear Doctor: -
I trust you will pardon my writing you as I am, but I am in such
great distress and so anxious to find some way out of it, that this
is my only excuse. I am a young man, married, and have been
unfortunate enough to have gotten a young woman friend into
trouble, to be plain, she is in a family way. Of course, I cannot
marry her, and the condition she is in makes it necessary that
she be afforded relief at as early a period as possible. She cannot
permit the matter to go to full period either, as that would mean
the ruin of her reputation, a thing not to be thought of. The girl
is only twenty-two years old and is about two and a half months
gone. If you can and will take this matter for us and relieve the
girl of her trouble, will you please let me know what it will cost
and about how long she would have to stay up there in
199. Id. at 455.
2O0. Id.
201. Maxey, 30 App. D.C. at 66.
202. Quantz, 106 F. Supp. at 560.
203. Kemp v. United States, 41 App. D.C. 539, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1914). The federal statute
made it illegal to send letters through the mail providing information on how to obtain an
abortion. Id.
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Washington? Will it be necessary for her to go to a Hospital or
could the business be done here by the use of medicines? I want
to be frank and tell you that we have tried two or three things
we saw advertised and got at the drug store here, but they have
been without effect.
Sincerely,
Quincy Compton.2'
Dr. Kemp responded to the (fictitious) Mr. Compton general
delivery at the Concord, North Carolina Post Office as follows:
"Dear Sir:- Your letter received and would say it would cost about
two hundred & would have to stay here one week - destroy this
letter - Can't write about this better come - This is answer to
your letter won't sign my name. " "c Some days later, a Detective
Honvery arrived at 433 G. Street, and introduced himself to Kemp
as "Quincy Compton.' Kemp told Honvery that he would not perform
the operation in his office, but rather in a room at the Metropolitan
Hotel, which he proceeded to reserve for the supposed patient." 7
Dr. Kemp was subsequently convicted under the United States
Code section, which proscribed sending any advertisement or
information about abortion services through the mail.2 '8 On appeal,
he argued that his letter facially contained no abortion information,
that the offense was impossible since both the letter's purported
author and the patient were fictitious persons, and that he had
been entrapped by the postal inspectors." The Court of Appeals
ruled that the letter's meaning could be taken in the context of the
document to which it replied and Dr. Kemp's subsequent statements
and actions."" It further held that the non-existence of author or
patient was immaterial, since the offense under section 1461 was
complete upon mailing of the letter." The court also rejected
Kemp's entrapment defense on the grounds that:
[The letter] was not such an inducement to commit crime as the
law condemns. It left the way open to defendant... either to act
the part of an honest man or the part of a criminal. Without any
influence from anyone he chose the latter course .... "[Tihe
204. Id. at 542-43.
205. Id. at 543.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 541-42 (convicting Kemp under 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1911)).
209. Kemp 1, 41 App. D.C. at 544-48.
210. Id. at 544-46.
211. Id. at 546.
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allegation of the defendant would be but the repetition of the
plea as ancient as the world... 'The serpent beguiled me and I
did eat.' That defense was overruled by the great Lawgiver and
... has never since availed to shield crime.. . and it is safe to
say that under any code of civilized, not to say Christian ethics,
it never will." 21 2
Kemp was sentenced to two years in federal prison, but his
sentence was commuted to a fine of $500 by President Woodrow
Wilson.21" The four-line letter did not ultimately cost Dr. Kemp his
freedom, but it did cost him his medical license: the Board of
Medical Supervisors revoked it on May 29, 1916.214 This
administrative decision was reviewable by the Court of Appeals,
wherein Kemp argued that his crime - the mailing of a letter -
was not one of moral turpitude, and thus could not be the basis for
discipline on that ground." 5 The court upheld the revocation,
finding that "[albortion is held to involve moral turpitude....
Analyzing [appellant's] motive . . . but one conclusion can be
reached; namely, a willful and intentional disposition on his part,
for a small pecuniary consideration, to prostitute his high profession."' 5
E. Bribery Of Witnesses
As a class of defendants, physicians are likely to have greater
financial resources than most individuals. The collateral
consequences of conviction also tend to be greater than for other
defendant classes, because physicians' livelihoods are dependant on
both reputation and government licensing. It is not surprising,
then, that physicians often spent considerable sums litigating their
defenses. On occasion, the combination of a strong motivation to
escape conviction and economic wherewithal to finance payoffs and
bribes led District of Columbia physicians to influence justice by
illicit means.
Dr. Henry M. Ladrey was indicted in October of 1943 for
performing an abortion on Hazel Queenan.2 17 Three months later,
Queenan informed Metropolitan Police detectives that the doctor's
wife, Eva, had scheduled a meeting at Queenan's home for the
212. Id. at 547 (quoting Bd. of Comm'rs of Excise v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y.
Sup. 1864)).
213. Kemp v. Board of Medical Supervisors, 46 App. D.C. 173, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1917).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 181.
216. Id. at 181-82 (internal citations omitted).
217. Ladry v. United States, 155 F.2d. 417, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
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evening of January 7th.218 That night, Police Sergeants Scott and
Crooke listened from a back room while Mrs. Ladrey offered
Queenan $260 to "drop the charges."219 Mrs. Ladrey produced an
envelope containing $100, and promised the rest ($100 to complete
the bribe and $60 as a refund of the abortion fee) once the charges
were dropped.
220
Mrs. Ladrey was immediately arrested, and, according to Scott
and Crooke's testimony, did not deny her purpose in coming to
Queenan's home.2 ' Scott and Crooke told Mrs. Ladrey that they
planned to search the area for anyone who might have brought her
to the house.' According to the policemen, Mrs. Ladrey then
declared, "Well, I will tell you, I am Mrs. Ladrey. Dr. Ladrey is
waiting at 6th and Trumbull for me."' As promised, Dr. Ladrey
was discovered waiting by his car at that intersection. When
questioned, he admitted dropping Mrs. Ladrey off in the vicinity,
but denied knowing where she was going or what she intended to
do."' Unsurprisingly,
[the jury] regarded as incredible the declaration of a man who
lived in Alexandria, Virginia, that he had let his wife out of the
car in the darkness of a winter evening at Georgia Avenue and
Trumbull Street, some miles from their residence, but that he
did not know where she was going or what she was going to do.2
The Ladreys were convicted of attempted bribery under D.C.
Code section 22-701, and their convictions were affirmed in May,
1946." The outcome of Dr. Ladrey's underlying abortion charge is
uncertain, but his brush with the law evidently did not deter him
from performing abortions upon completion of his sentence. In
November 1954, Ladrey instructed a man by the name of Matthews
to bring an anonymous patient to Ladrey's N Street office.221
Ladrey performed a surgical abortion, complications from which
subsequently proved fatal to the patient.2' After making a
218. Id.
219. Id It is not clear from the opinion whether the government could or would have
successfully prosecuted the case without the complaining witness.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 419.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 420.
226. Id. at 418.
227. Ladrey v. Comm'n on Licensure to Practice the Healing Art, 261 F.2d 68, 72 (1958).
228. Id. at 69.
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statement at police headquarters, Matthews agreed to telephone
Ladrey while a homicide detective listened on an extension.2' While
Ladrey was not charged in the death, his incriminating statements
were sufficient evidence for the Medical Licensure Commission to
revoke Ladrey's license on grounds of professional misconduct."0
Curiously, loss of his license did not prevent Dr. Ladrey from
becoming Imperial Director of the Shrine Tuberculosis and Cancer
Research Foundation the following year, a post he held until 1982.23
The pattern of an accused physician attempting to bribe his
patient through a female intermediary was repeated in 1950 by
Dr. William Goodloe.232 Goodloe was under grand jury investigation
for allegedly attempting an abortion on Gloria Huffman. 3 Dr.
Goodloe's offer was more substantial than Dr. Ladrey's: he intended
to relocate Huffman to California at his expense if she would depart
before she was subpoenaed.' Goodloe employed a female acquaintance
named Alice Galusha to negotiate with Huffman, who was reluctant to
accept." Galusha rode with Goodloe to Huffman's Baltimore home
on several occasions, where she was ultimately arrested by policemen
who observed her from a closet as she produced $600 and offered to
purchase an airline ticket for Huffman."" Based largely on
Huffman's grand jury testimony, Dr. Goodloe was indicted for
abortion, conspiracy, and attempted bribery; he was convicted on all
counts and sentenced to seven years imprisonment.
2 7
Dr. Allen Forte, previously convicted of abortion in North
Carolina in 1942, moved his practice to Washington, D.C. at some
point before 1961."a In that year, Forte was indicted for allegedly
performing an abortion on Jean Smith of Baltimore.29 Despite
Smith's trial testimony, Forte was acquitted, based on his defense
that the alleged abortion had been fabricated as part of a
"shakedown" by a rogue D.C. police officer.'3 Forte's accusations led
to a grand jury investigation of the policeman, but the investigation
soon revealed quite a different picture of events."' When the initial
229. Id. at 72.
230. Id. at 69.
231. History of Magnus Temple #3 at httpJ/www.geodties.com/acdjulyhnagnushistorytml.
232. Goodloe v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 621, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 622.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 621.
238. Laughlin v. United States, 385 F.2d287, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1967) [hereinafter Laughlin V1.
239. Id. at 289.
240. Id.
241. ld.
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police investigation of the alleged abortion had ensued, Forte and
his attorney James Laughlin had apparently retained the services
of Baltimore police officer Bernice Gross. 2 Not only did Gross
attempt to obstruct the investigation on Forte and Laughlin's behalf,
she also acted as a go-between in their attempts to bribe Jean
Smith.' Smith, it turned out, had accepted cash and baby clothes
from Gross in return for writing a letter to the United States
Attorney asking to be excused as a witness.'
As a result of their bribery and the subsequent cover-up (chiefly
Laughlin's denial to the grand jury that he had had any contact
with Gross despite wiretap evidence to the contrary),"' Laughlin
and Forte embarked on a legal odyssey of at least five separate
proceedings involving a mistrial, convictions for perjury, conspiracy,
witness tampering, reversal of these convictions, and eventual
reconviction.2 " Interestingly, while Laughlin retained counsel on
his own behalf, he continued to represent Forte himself.247 Laughlin
may not have been a particularly sympathetic character in the
Washington legal community. In 1949, he defended Mildred Gillars,
also known as "Axis Sally," the American Nazi propagandist of
Radio Berlin.2" He reportedly accused Jean Smith of being a
prostitute and had apparently leveled that charge against a female
witness in a previous case."4 One witness commented that the
grand jury investigation should be held "on a little higher standards
than Jim Laughlin's concept of trying a law case."
250
F. Defenses
Whatever their feelings about the social utility of their services,
abortion defendants stood accused of a serious criminal offense.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 289-90.
244. Id. at 289.
245. United States v. Laughlin, 222 F. Supp. 264, 264 (D.D.C. 1963) [hereinafter
Laughlin 11.
246. See Laughlin V; Laughlin v. United States, 344 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1965) [hereinafter
Laughlin V] United States v. Laughlin, 226 F. Supp. 112 (D.D.C. 1964) [hereinafter
Laughlin II](denying government motion to vacate dismissal); United States v. Laughlin,
223 F. Supp. 623 (D.D.C. 1963)hereinafter Laughlin I1l(dismissing indictment); Laughlin I,
222 F. Supp. 264.
247. Laughlin I, 222 F. Supp. at 264; Laughlin II, 223 F. Supp. at 624; Laughlin IV, 344
F.2d at 188.
248. See Dale P. Harper, Axis Sally, WORLD WAR II, Nov. 1995, available at
http:/twomenshistory.about.com/library/prm/blaxissally2.htm.
249. Laughlin V, 385 F.2d at 292.
250. Id.
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When hailed into court, it was rarely prudent for them to rely on
the political philosophy behind the provision of abortion. Rather,
like all accused criminals, abortion providers needed to advance
some legal or factual theory that would place their conduct outside
the prohibitions of the statute.
"I didn't do it" is of course the simplest defense to any crime.
When there is a dead body to be explained, this defense often results
in the classic 'plan B' - casting suspicion on another culprit. When
death occurs from septic abortion, the most obvious 'plan B' culprit
is the victim herself. Kate Maxey's defense to the abortion death of
Claudia Parrish was accordingly straightforward: Claudia had
induced the miscarriage and resulting infection herself.25'
The difficulty with this theory was that two witnesses put
Claudia (heretofore a stranger) in Mrs. Maxey's house on the day of
the abortion. 2 Police subsequently discovered a catheter in a
bedroom.' Maxey's counsel advanced what may be grotesquely
termed the 'pencil defense.' He first persuaded the government's
medical witness to admit on cross-examination that the uterine
injury could have resulted from vaginal insertion of a lead pencil."5
He next put Maxey's daughter-in-law, Mary Lackey, on the stand."6
Lackey testified that she overheard Claudia tell Maxey that she
was pregnant, that she was "bound to get rid of it ... [and was]
going to do something very rash." 57 She explained that she had
used Hunyadi water and "some kind of pill."' On Lackey's cross-
examination, she added to the deceased's former statement of using
Hunyadi water and a pill, a "lead pencil to bring on a miscarriage."2 9
The catheter, Lackey claimed, belonged to her; Maxey often used it
on Lackey to "draw water" (on medical orders), but she had never
known Maxey to perform an abortion.2' Not surprisingly, the jury
did not afford this defense very much weight - Kate Maxey was
convicted along with Claudia's paramour Paul Meagher.26'
Another defense was available for licensed physicians who
could legitimately perform gynecological procedures: the operation
251. Maxey v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 63, 71 (D.C. Cir, 1907).
252. Id. at 70.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 69.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 70.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 71.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 64.
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took place, but it was not an abortion. Dr. Alva Harper advanced
this defense in 1956, claiming that his patient had presented with
a complaint of vaginal bleeding. 2 The procedure during which he
"inserted some medicine into her body through an instrument
known as a speculum" was not an attempt to abort the pregnancy,
he claimed, but rather to preserve it. 26 Unfortunately for Dr.
Harper, the government called two rebuttal witnesses, each of
whom testified that Harper had previously performed abortions on
them.' Although seemingly in violation of the character propensity
ban on prior-crimes evidence, this testimony was admitted as
evidence of Harper's intent.2" Harper's objection, motion for a new
trial, and appeal on this point were rejected; he was convicted and
his conviction affirmed.26
Dr. Harper also attempted to raise a second defense: that his
patient may not have been pregnant when the procedure was
performed." 7 This defense would likely have failed on the facts, as
the evidence indicated that Dr. Harper's patient was pregnant.268
Curiously, however, this sort of impossibility defense had been
rejected as a matter of law the previous year in Peckham H." In
that case, the D.C. Circuit approved the district court's instruction
to the jury that the patient's actual pregnancy was immaterial so
long as the defendant believed he was inducing a miscarriage.7
Comparing the statutes of various states, it found that while
many explicitly required pregnancy, many others did not, and still
others (including D.C. since the 1901 code) were silent on the
matter."' The court held that this silence should be interpreted as
making pregnancy unnecessary, although the only support it could
find for this ruling was contained in two nineteenth century
English cases. 2
Given the language of the D.C. statute, an obvious defense to
abortion is therapeutic necessity. If the life or health of the patient
were threatened, then abortion was permissible in the District of
262. United States v. Harper, 137 F. Supp. 4, 5 (D.D.C. 1956).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 7.
266. Id. at 8; Harper v. United States, 239 F.2d 945, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
267. Harper I, 137 F. Supp. at 7-8.
268. Id. at 8.
269. Peckham II, 226 F.2d at 34-35.
270. Id. at 34.
271. Id.
272. Id. (citing R. v. Titley, 14 Cox. Crim. Cases 502 (Q.B. 1880); R. v. Goodall, 2 Cox. Crim
Cases 41 (Q.B. 1846)).
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Columbia.27 This was a very liberal standard compared to the
majority of states, which allowed only a life-of-the-mother exceptionY 4
It is, however, not immediately obvious from the statute whether
the exception is intended as an affirmative defense or as a
necessary element in the government's prima facie case.' 7 This
ambiguity was settled in 1943 when raised by the defendants in
Williams v. United States."78 The court relied on a two-prong test,
articulated by Justice Cardozo in Morrison v. California,277 in order
to determine whether a statutory excuse requires proof by the
defendant or disproof by the government.2 8 Under this test, the
burden of proving excuse properly belongs to the defense when the
act is 'sinister' in character (unless excused), or when there exists
"a manifest disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for
knowledge."279 In Williams, the court found, on the second prong,
that evidence of whether an abortion was medically necessary is
clearly more available to the person who performs it. 2" On the first
prong, it determined that Cardozo's 'sinister act' requirement was
met because
abortion is generally regarded as heinous in character.... The
performance of an abortionfor [non-medical] purposesissooffensiveto
our moral conception that it does not seem unjust to put on the
defendant who has committed an abortion the burden of producing
evidence that the act was justified on therapeutic grounds."'
This requirement remained a part of D.C.'s abortion jurisprudence
for twenty-eight years, until the United States Supreme Court shifted
the burden back to the government in United States v. Vuitch.282
The Court, authorized, at that time, to interpret D.C. statutes de
novo found that when Congress passed the District of Columbia
abortion law in 1901 and amended it in 1953, it expressly
authorized physicians to perform such abortions as are necessary
to preserve the mother's "life or health." Because abortions were
authorized only in more restrictive circumstances under previous
273. D.C. CODE ANN. § 809 (1901).
274. See Williams v. United States, 138 F.2d. 81, 83-84 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
275. See id. at 81.
276. Id.
277. 291 U.S. 82, 88 (1934).
278. Williams, 138 F.2d. at 82-83.
279. Id. at 82 (quoting Morrison, 291 U.S. at 91).
280. Id. at 83.
281. Id.
282. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70-71 (1971).
283. Id. at 70.
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D.C. law, the change must represent a judgment by Congress that
it is desirable for women to be able to obtain abortions for the
preservation of their lives or health.
It would be highly anomalous for a legislature to authorize
abortions necessary for life or health and then to demand that
a doctor, upon pain of one to ten years' imprisonment, bear the
burden of proving that an abortion he performed fell within that
category. Placing such a burden of proof on a doctor would be
peculiarly inconsistentwith society's notions ofthe responsibilities
of the medical profession. Generally, doctors are encouraged by
society's expectations, by the strictures of malpractice law, and
by their own professional standards to give their patients such
treatment as is necessary to preserve their health. We are
unable to believe that Congress intended that a physician be
required to prove his innocence.'
Perhaps the most unusual answer to a District of Columbia
abortion charge was the insanity defense raised by Catherine
Hopkins in 1959.' After a series of telephone calls, Hopkins
traveled to the home of an unnamed woman on March 3, 1956.'
Shortly after arriving, Hopkins summoned her sister, Mrs. Simmons."7
On Simmons' arrival, she met a woman who "wished to get rid of a
child," and wanted Simmons to babysit her young daughter while
she and Hopkins remained upstairs.2" Simmons warned Hopkins
"not to do anything that would get her into trouble," but agreed to
watch the girl and answer the door if anyone came to the house.289
What happened upstairs is unclear, but it apparently involved fifty
dollars,' a catheter,"9 and took place in "an outrageous and brutal
manner, the details of which are too repulsive for recital as a part
of [a judicial] opinion."' As a result of the surgery, Mrs. Simmons
and her husband had to rush the woman to D.C. General Hospital.2"'
After identifying Hopkins as her abortion provider, she died.2"
Less than four months later, Hopkins herself was admitted to
284. Id. at 71.
285. Hopkins v. United States, 275 F.2d 155, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
286. Id. at 159 (Bastian, J., dissenting).
287. Id. (Bastian, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 160 (Bastian, J., dissenting).
289. Id. (Bastian, J., dissenting).
290. Id. at 159 (Bastian, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 161 (Bastian, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 158 (Bastian, J., dissenting).
293. Id. (Bastian, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 158-59 (Bastian, J., dissenting).
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D.C. General.295 She would spend two months there before being
transferred to St. Elizabeth's Hospital (the District's mental health
facility) with a diagnosis of schizophrenic reaction, schizoaffective
type.' After nearly two years in St. Elizabeth's, Hopkins stood trial
for second-degree murder, which had become the available charge
in fatal abortion cases under the 1953 amendment to Section 22-
201.29 At trial, the defense presented several psychiatrists, as well
as Hopkins' mother, who testified that ever since an ear operation
at the age of eight, Hopkins had "just acted plum different."298 Her
mother explained that as a teenager Hopkins complained of hearing
voices, tore out her hair, and attempted to jump out of windows. 99
Hopkins' mother testified that, on one occasion, her daughter had
"called the undertaker and sent him to a girl friend's home on
Eleventh Street. She sent flowers to the girl, and told me the girl
was dead. And I called and they said she wasn't dead."3"
Sitting without a jury, the district court convicted Hopkins,
finding that she was not legally insane at the time of the
abortion."' The court of appeals reversed, finding that "[iun the
present case, the evidence of insanity was plainly substantial." °2 It
remanded the case for entry of a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity and an order committing Hopkins to a mental hospital ,0
8
Although the preceding defenses range from the obvious to the
bizarre, all turn on either the statute's application to the defendant's
conduct or on whether the conduct is otherwise excusable. None
question the propriety of the law itself. For that type of challenge,
Washington, D.C. would have to wait for a pugnacious Yugoslav
backed by a cadre of civil libertarians.
G. The Constitutional Attack of United States v. Vuitch
Milan Vuitch was not unused to conflict. Born in Serbia in
1915, he had completed his medical training in Hungary only to be
captured during the Nazi invasion and conscripted into the Army
Medical Corps of the Third Reich."°' Vuitch immigrated to D.C.,
295. Id. at 156 (majority opinion).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 156.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 155.
302. Id. at 157.
303. Id. at 158.
304. LAWRENCE LADER, ABORTION II: MAKING THE REVOLUTION 9 (1973).
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where he openly flouted Section 22-201, bringing his skill at
abortion (common in Yugoslavia) first to the Eastern European
immigrant community and later to the community at large.3°' He
appears to have been motivated by compassion rather than profit.
He generally charged between $100 and $200, which was a fraction
of the 'going rate' for abortion services.3" Vuitch once explained,
"Women cry for help, and doctors just chase them away. I saw
people dying like flies in the war, and I couldn't do much. If I can
help now, why shouldn't I?"3" Indeed, Vuitch continued to perform
abortions even after two arrests and a trial, which ended in ahungjury.s
Vuitch's passion for his work and belief in its social value made
him an ideal subject for the test case planned by a civil rights
committee which would later become the National Abortion Rights
Action League (NARAL). 3" The District's prohibition was targeted
for a number of reasons. First, a trial in the nation's capital would
have strong symbolic significance.1 0 Second, the federal courts'
unique supervision of D.C.'s 'state' law meant that an appellate
court would have broad powers of statutory interpretation.3" Third,
Section 22-201 was rare in that it permitted abortion to save the
health of the patient as well as her life. 12 This ambiguity would
provide the primary basis for Dr. Vuitch's challenge.
Vuitch undertook a course of action calculated to result in his
arrest. He instructed normally clandestine referral services to
openly provide his name and phone number. 1 Instead of performing
abortions early in the morning or late at night, as had been his
practice, he mixed them in with his general surgery patients during
the daytime. 14 Additionally, he abandoned the use of code words
and middlemen common to the illegal abortion community.3 5
305. Id. at 10.
306. Id. at 9.
307. Id. at 8.
308. Id. at 11. After these incidents, which occurred in Maryland and Virginia, Vuitch
restricted his abortion practice to the District of Columbia, where he believed the more
liberal health exception of § 22-201 would render him less liable to prosecution. Id.
309. Id. at 11-16.
310. Id. at 3.
311. Id. at 3.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 2.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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These actions inevitably forced the police to take action. 16 They
also removed the potential that secretive behavior could be used as
evidence of a guilty state of mind. 17
On May 1,1968, the Metropolitan Police Department Homicide
Squad raided Vuitch's office."' 8 They had been tipped off by a
patient's husband, who had impregnated his estranged wife during
a temporary reconciliation." 9 This informant, Donald R., arrived at
Dr. Vuitch's office with his wife and $300 in marked bills."0 Once
Mrs. R was on the table, Donald signaled the police, who seized the
operating table and instruments, arrested Dr. Vuitch, and transported
Mrs. R. (whether voluntarily is unclear) to D.C. General Hospital
for examination. 21
Mrs. R. had inadvertently proven the perfect 'victim' for the
test case. As the 'health' justification for her abortion was a purely
mental health condition, premised on social grounds, it fell at the
margin of health risks that Section 22-201 might conceivably
permit.3" Vuitch asserted that: "This woman had described her
mental suffering - her husband's frequent desertions and
extramarital affairs, an unwanted pregnancy by a husband she
detested - it was all down on my chart. Only I, as her doctor, could
decide whether her health had been threatened."3  For "the police
.. [and] some district attorney" 2' to make this judgment instead
of the physician created a "vague requirement, altogether lacking
acceptable standards" under which "there will never be an instance
in which a physician is able to defend his actions successfully where
the evidence shows an exercise of medical judgment."'25 Thus,
Vuitch could argue, application of the law violated his own due
process rights.
Vuitch's challenge went beyond void-for-vagueness' due process
and struck at the very notion of the government's legitimacy in
regulating abortion. In what would become the familiar twin
challenges to abortion regulation in the United States, Vuitch
argued that Section 22-201 violated both the fundamental rights
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 2-3 (relating the story of'Mr. R.,' who impregnated not only his estranged wife
but also another woman and a sixteen-year-old girl).
320. Id. at 3.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 3.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 14.
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and the equal protection guarantees implied in the Fifth
Amendment (the Fourteenth Amendment not applying to the
District of Columbia).12' His equal protection argument concerned
the disproportionate impact of Section 22-201 on poor and black
women in the District,3 27 and his fundamental rights due process
argument followed the holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut and
Loving v. Virginia.3"
The public interest in the Vuitch case was so strong that Judge
Arnold Gesell read his memorandum opinion from the bench to a
full courtroom of spectators. 32 Gesell announced that the exceptions
portion of the statute was void for vagueness because "itihe jury's
acceptance or nonacceptance of an individual doctor's interpretation
of the ambivalent and uncertain word health' should not determine
whether he stands convicted of a felony, facing ten years'
imprisonment."330 Gesell went so far as to say that Section 22-201's
"many ambiguities are particularly subject to criticism for the
statute unquestionably impinges to an appreciable extent on
significant constitutional rights of individuals."33" ' Despite agreeing
with the Equal Protection and fundamental rights arguments in
principle, he was unwilling to strike down the statute as a whole.
He suggested that "Congress should re-examine the statute
promptly in the light of current conditions,"32 but ultimately
concluded that "[t]he court cannot legislate."833
Briefly, Washington became the only American jurisdiction in
which legal abortion was available throughout pregnancy on the
judgment of a single physician." 4 Vuitch's practice boomed, and
patients frequently waited up to four weeks for an appointment."
Even at the height of his success, Vuitch continued to charge no
more than $300 per abortion and often operated on indigent women
free of charge." 6 This brief interlude in the life of Dr. Vuitch and
the women of Washington, D.C. came to an end, however, when the
Supreme Court determined that 'health' was not overly vague and
reversed the district court's dismissal of the indictment. 37
326. United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969) [hereinafter Vuitch 11.
327. Id. at 1035.
328. Id. (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
329. LADER, supra note 304, at 15.
330. Vuitch I, 305 F. Supp. at 1034.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1035-36.
333. Id. at 1035.
334. LADER, supra note 304, at 15.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 9.
337. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 64 (1971).
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Despite this defeat, the Vuitch test case had achieved a great
deal. In its ruling, the Supreme Court found that Section 22-201
could not be read to place the burden of proving medical necessity
on the defendant.3"' It thereby overturned the onerous rule of
Williams. 9 Furthermore, in finding that 'health' was not overly
vague, the Court explicitly ruled that purely psychological injuries
were permissible grounds for abortion.' Section 22-201 was thus
considerably weakened for the two years it survived before Roe v.
Wade. Perhaps most importantly, the Vuitch test case inspired
dozens like it in jurisdictions throughout the country. It shaped
both the jurisprudence and the popular will that would ultimately
lead to the recognition of legal abortion as a constitutional right.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the time of its creation, the District of Columbia possessed
no written laws to govern its citizens' practice of abortion. The legal
tradition to which the District was heir, however, encompassed a
rich history of reasoning on its legitimacy. The tortious miscarriage
provisions of 21 Exodus 21: 22-25 began the recorded legal history
of fetal protection law in Western civilization. Although ambiguous
in the original Hebrew text, by the third century B.C., the language
of Exodus was interpreted to signify a mid-gestational attachment
of fetal protection. Following Aristotelian notions of fetal
development, the early and medieval Christian church adopted this
delineation as consistent with the Augustine notion of ensoulment.
In England, the point of attached protection was defined
precisely at quickening, the first fetal movements that were taken
as evidence of the rational soul's arrival. Thus, the District
inherited a common law abortion rule arguably in tune with
women's subjective experiences of their own bodies: the law of
homicide protected the fetus as an independent being only after its
manifestation at quickening.
The nineteenth century physicians' anti-abortion campaign
sought to change this status quo by criminalizing abortion at all
stages of pregnancy. The American Medical Association's motivations
for this movement were, to a large degree, self-interested and
independent of the moral justifications it advanced. The campaign
was arguably as much about restraining competition from
338. Id. at 69-70.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 72.
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'irregulars' (especially midwives) as it was about preserving fetal
life. Employing imagery that ranged from miniature men suspended
in amniotic fluid to infant kangaroos suckling in a pouch, the anti-
abortion movement presented dubious physiological arguments
against the practice of abortion. The movement also drew heavily
on contemporary social concerns, painting abortion as a byproduct
of misguided feminism, a threat to female morality and family
order, and a tool by which immigrants would displace native-born
Protestants as the dominant American class. In response to this
campaign, the Legislative Assembly of the District of Columbia
passed a comprehensive conception-to-birth abortion prohibition
in 1872.
Life under this prohibition presented numerous dangers for the
women of Washington D.C. and the abortion providers who
continued to serve them despite the legal condemnation of their
conduct. While women were not prosecuted for obtaining abortions,
their reliance on undertrained practitioners working at remote
locations without medical backup often proved injurious or fatal in
an age before the existence of antibiotics or widespread
understanding of sterile techniques. Women who had undergone
abortions faced legal disabilities before the courts: their testimony
was discounted, they were subject to vicious cross-examination,
and they were barred from recovery for injury sustained from
negligence during their abortions.
Abortion providers were the most frequent defendants under
the District's abortion prohibition. In addition to incarceration, they
faced the loss of their livelihoods through license revocation and
loss of the good reputation so essential to the maintenance of a
medical practice. Generally, they escaped punishment if they did
not maim or kill their patients, but occasionally the government
was more aggressive, targeting providers through 'sting' operations.
While physicians generally used their money and influence to
defend themselves through legal means, a few succumbed to
temptation and sought to bribe witnesses and police.
Abortion providers advanced a range of defenses to their
alleged crimes. Some put forth fanciful blame-the-victim theories.
Others claimed that the operation in question had been something
other than abortion, or abortion but with therapeutic justification.
At least one defendant claimed to have been insane at the time she
killed her client.
D.C.'s abortion prohibition ultimately yielded to a constitutional
challenge, and though it was reinstated by the Supreme Court, it
had been significantly weakened and would survive only two more
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years before being struck down by the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade. Although the century of criminal abortion in the nation's
capital came to an end a generation ago, its lessons remain valuable
as the battle over abortion rights continues in the city's corridors
of power.
While judges and politicians may be tempted to regard the
abortion question as arising from contemporary social and scientific
considerations, its legal and philosophical bases stretch back into
classical antiquity. While abortion opponents speak publicly of
protecting fetal life, their intellectual predecessors acted from quite
different motivations and appealed to agendas that arguably
remain below the surface of the current rhetoric. While abortion
rights proponents focus their arguments solely on female privacy
and autonomy, they ignore centuries of fetal protection jurisprudence,
which must be conscientiously addressed if it is to be subordinated
or abandoned. Most importantly, jurists and policy makers must
understand that abortion has always been a part of human
experience and remains so even when prohibited. Throughout the
nation, as in its capital, women will seek abortions, whether access
to the procedure is guaranteed by or prohibited by the law.
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